Real Estate and Construction Law Blog

SCOPE v. County of Los Angeles (November 26, 2007, B189116) 157 Cal. App. 4th 149

By Maria Pracher and Misti Schmidt

The California Court of Appeal for the Second District recently issued the first appellate opinion to apply the four principles delineated by the California Supreme Court in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412 ("Vineyard").  These principles govern whether the water services discussion in an Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") sufficiently analyzes the availability of future water supplies.  Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment, et al.,  v. County of Los Angeles, 157 Cal. App. 4th 149, Civil No. B189116 at 9 (November 26, 2007) ("SCOPE").  Briefly, the Vineyard principles are:

Douda v. California Coastal Commission (February 6, 2008, B188210) ___ Cal.App.4th ___

By Aaron Foxworthy

The Second Appellate District affirmed a lower court decision that when acting as the issuing agency for a Coastal Development Permit (CDP) application, the California Coastal Commission may designate a portion of the subject property as an Environmentally Sensitive Habitat Area (ESHA) during consideration of the CDP application.  And, the Commission may then reject the CDP application based in part on potential impacts to the newly designated ESHA.  The decision is a cautionary tale for parties seeking to develop – or purchase for development – property in the Coastal Zone, that the Commission retains broad authority to designate ESHAs and restrict development.

Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission (January 25, 2008, A114647)  ___ Cal. App.4^th ___

By Bry Martin

The First Appellate District held that the California Coastal Commission does not have the authority to designate property an "environmentally sensitive habitat area" (ESHA) where a certified Local Coastal Program (LCP) is in place, and the LCP has neither designated the property as an ESHA, nor contains language anticipating later designation of the property as an ESHA through administrative action.  The decision stands to protect developers and local governments by recognizing the LCP as a bulwark against the uncertainty created by potential ESHA determinations rendered by the Coastal Commission in the appeals process.

Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra, et al. (January 9, 2008, C055448) __Cal. App. 4th

By Bry Martin

In a victory for public participation advocacy groups and a defeat to efforts to increase efficiency in the planning and development process, the California Court of Appeals for the Third District struck down Sierra County’s “streamlined zoning process,” which had permitted the county to provide notice of a legislative public hearing on a zoning ordinance or zoning ordinance amendment before the legislative body received a planning commission recommendation.  The court held that, under California Government Code sections 65854, 65856, 65090, and 65094, the local agency must give notice of the legislative body’s public hearing on a zoning ordinance or zoning ordinance amendment only after the planning commission has submitted its recommendation to the legislative body, and the public notice must contain the planning commission’s recommendation.

Lincoln Place Tenants Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles (September 19, 2007, B193235 [2^nd Dist. , Div. 7]) ___ Cal. App. 4^th ____; http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/opinions

By Alexis M. Pelosi

In this case, the Second District Court of Appeal confirmed that the Ellis Act does not preempt CEQA and that cities have a continuing obligation to comply with mitigation measures required under CEQA.

By Maria Pracher and William Fleishhacker

On August 21, 2007, the California State Legislature ended a 52?day budget stalemate, agreeing to a $145 billion spending plan.  As part of that agreement, the lawmakers passed minor amendments to the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).  The amendments require the State Office of Planning and Research to develop and prepare guidelines addressing the analysis and feasible mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, as required by CEQA.  These guidelines must be adopted by the Resources Agency by January 1, 2010.  The amendments also provide an exemption for certain projects from CEQA lawsuits based on claims that the effects of greenhouse gas emissions were not adequately analyzed or mitigated in an Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) or other CEQA document prepared for the project.  The projects exempted are any transportation or flood protection projects funded by the $25 billion bond measures passed by the voters in 2006.  The CEQA exemptions are temporary, expiring on January 1, 2010.

By William M. Fleishhacker

In Mani Brothers Real Estate Group v. City of Los Angeles, the Second District Court of Appeal of California addressed the issue of whether the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) and the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency (the “CRA”) properly relied on a 2005 Addendum to a 1989 environmental impact report (“EIR”) in approving a modified project. In doing so, the Court specifically rejected the analysis of a 2006 case which held that the initial inquiry should focus on whether the changes amount to a “new project” requiring an EIR.  Rather, under the substantial evidence standard of review, and based on CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines, the Court held that the proper question is whether the changes result in new significant impacts compared to the original project.

Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (2007) __ Cal. __

By Arthur J. Friedman, David P. Lanferman and Elizabeth S. Anderson

In Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Commission, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that the adoption of the Travis Air Force Base Land Use Plan (the "Plan") by the Solano County Airport Land Use Commission (the "Commission") was a "project" for purposes of CEQA.  In this particular case, however, the Court affirmed the Commission's determination that the adoption of the Plan was exempt from CEQA pursuant to the "common sense" exemption since the Plan simply reiterated existing Solano County General Plan land use policies.  This decision is significant in that the Court: (1) upheld the use of the "common sense" exemption from CEQA review, even though "legitimate questions were raised" about the possible environmental impacts of the adoption of the Plan and the Commission had erred by failing to identify substantial evidence in the record in support of its invocation of the exemption; and (2) also acknowledged that CEQA may require lead agencies to consider the effects of "displaced development" resulting from restrictive land use policies where such development can be reasonably anticipated.

LT-WR, L.L.C. v. California Coastal Commission et al, No. B187666 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. May 25, 2007)

By Jeffrey W. Forrest

The Second District Court of Appeal of California upheld a trial court decision that the California Coastal Commission (the “Commission”) exceeded its authority when the Commission denied a private landowner a permit for gates and “no trespassing” signs.  The appellate court found that the Commission’s ruling that there was a “potential” to establish prescriptive rights for public use on the property “speculative.”

Like “squatter’s rights”, prescriptive access rights are created when the public openly and repeatedly accesses private property for a sufficient period of time without the landowner’s permission.  The Commission’s denial of the permit in effect decreed the existence of such access rights and was inappropriate because the Coastal Act does not grant the Commission the authority to create prescriptive public access rights.  Only a court has the authority to adjudicate and determine whether prescriptive access rights exist.

By Arthur J. Friedman

On May 22, 2007, the Napa County Superior Court issued its ruling in American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth et al. v. City of American Canyon et al. (Napa County Superior Court Case No. 26-27462), approving the City’s “addendum” to the previously approved mitigated negative declaration, and thereby authorizing the partially constructed and approved Wal-Mart supercenter in American Canyon to proceed with construction and operations.  The court’s ruling is significant in part because it rejected the petitioners’ novel claim that the City was required to perform “supplemental” environmental review of the project’s potential impacts on climate change in response to the California legislature’s recent enactment of Assembly Bill 32.

Feduniak et al., v. California Coastal Commission (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 1346.

By Michael R. Leake

The Sixth District Court of Appeals of California overturned a trial court decision and rejected the claim of a Monterey County coastal property homeowner that the Commission should be estopped from requiring the removal of a three-hole, pitch-and-putt golf course from the property and restoration of the area to its original landscape of native dune vegetation because the Commission failed to take any action regarding the existence of the golf course in violation of restrictions placed on the property by the Commission despite the fact that the golf course was easily visible and had been there for 18 years.

Friends Of The Sierra Railroad v. Tuolumne Park and Recreation District  (filed January 12, 2007; certified for publication February 8, 2007, F050117) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction

In this case plaintiff Friends of the Sierra Railroad (Friends) challenged the approval and sale of land from Tuolumne Park and Recreation District (District) to Tuolumne Band of Me-Wuk Indians (Real Party).  The land sold contained a portion of an historic railroad right?of?way.  Friends contended that the sale constituted a “project” under CEQA, requiring prior environmental review.  The Court of Appeal held that the transfer of the land was not a “project” under CEQA under the circumstances of this case.  While some development of the property was reasonably foreseeable, review of possible impacts to the historical resource would be premature in the absence of any specific proposal for development.

Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside  (filed January 10, 2007; certified for publication February 2, 2007, A113376) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction

In this case plaintiff Uphold Our Heritage (Heritage) challenged the issuance by the Town of Woodside (Town) of a permit to Steve Jobs (Jobs) to demolish a mansion on his property to enable construction of a new single family residence.  The Court of Appeal held that Town's findings of infeasibility of certain EIR project alternatives involving rehabilitation of the existing structure rather than demolition were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. While the estimated costs of restoration of the mansion were before the Town Council (Council), the record was devoid of any information regarding the likely cost of a new residence (the proposed project). Without the information necessary to compare the restoration costs against the cost of the project, there was insufficient evidence to support the findings of infeasibility of rehabilitation alternatives.

McAllister v.County of Monterey et al.  (January 31, 2007, H028813) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction

This case involved a challenge by the plaintiff McAllister to approval of a coastal development permit issued to his neighbors ("Real Parties") for a single family residence on the Big Sur coast.  The primary issues addressed by the court were McAllister's arguments that (1) the County of Monterey's ("County") approval of the permit was null and void since a prior owner's violation of conditions of a previously issued development permit for the same property constituted a violation of the County Code and, therefore, divested the County of jurisdiction to approve the permit; and (2) the County violated CEQA by failing to prepare an EIR rather than a mitigated negative declaration in connection with the permit.

Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Community Services District et al.  (Filed January 2, 2007; certified for publication January 31, 2007, C050811) __ Cal.App.4^th__

By Lori Wider

Introduction and Background

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed the decision of the trial court  granting a petition for writ of mandate brought to challenge approval of an agreement between the McCloud Community Facilities District ("District") and Nestle Waters North America, Inc. ("Nestle") for the sale and purchase of spring water.  The lower court determined that the District had violated CEQA by failing to conduct environmental review prior to approving the agreement.  The appellate court disagreed, finding that approval of the agreement did not trigger the requirement for environmental review prior to District approval because (a) the agreement was expressly conditioned on future CEQA compliance; and (b) it did not commit the District to a course of action or commit it to issuance of any permits or other entitlements to Nestle.

California Farm Bureau Federation et al. v. California State Water Resources Control Board, (January 17, 2007, C050289) __ Cal.App.4th__ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions

By David P. Lanferman and Ella Foley-Gannon

The Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District has declared that regulatory fee schedules adopted by the State Water Rights Control Board (“Board”) in 2003, imposing new annual fees on holders of water rights permits and licenses are unconstitutional and invalid. The decision was based largely on the court’s finding that the Board failed to demonstrate the requisite “proportionality” between the costs of the Board’s regulatory program and the fees imposed on the targeted fee payors, and addressed several important issues frequently raised in the implementation and litigation of regulatory fees.

Black Hills Investments, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc. - January 12, 2007

By Thomas B. Snyder

On November 22, 2004, Black Hills entered into a contract to purchase two parcels of real property in a retail shopping center.  At the time of the contract, the two parcels had not yet been created through subdivision of the property.  Black Hills deposited earnest money of $133,000 which was described as non-refundable.  The contracts contained a provision which permitted the seller, Albertson's, to terminate the contract if it failed to obtain the proper governmental approvals for creation of the two parcels.  Black Hills was given no such right.

American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth v. City of American Canyon et al. (November 17, 2006; certified for partial publication December 18, 2006, A111278) __ Cal.App.4^th__ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions

By Lori Wider

In this case, the Court of Appeal determined that the City of American Canyon (“City”) violated CEQA because the City’s determination that project changes would not substantially increase traffic impacts was not supported by substantial evidence and the City failed to proceed in accordance with law by refusing to consider potential extraterritorial urban decay effects of a proposed Wal-Mart supercenter.  The changes would have increased the size of the approved project by 6.5% and added 30 traffic trips.  The Court also determined that the City violated its zoning ordinance by approving the supercenter without approving a major modification application.  Only the CEQA portion of the decision is certified for publication; the last section of the decision, addressing the alleged zoning ordinance violations, is not.

City of Goleta v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County  (December 21, 2006, S129125) __Cal.App.4th__http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions

By Maria Pracher

The California Supreme Court has held that the newly incorporated City of Goleta could disapprove a final subdivision map even though the vesting tentative subdivision map had been approved by Santa Barbara County.  Government Code section 66413.5(f), which provides for the mandatory approval of a final map by a newly incorporated city if the vesting tentative map has been approved by a county, did not apply given the facts in this case.  Additionally, the City's adoption of the County codes did not prevent it from denying the map, and nothing in the City's actions with respect to the project estopped it from denying the final map.

Calvert v. County of Yuba (December 5, 2006, C047857)__Cal.App.4^th__ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/

By Lori Wider

The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held that a vested rights determination under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act ("SMARA") regarding surface mining operations in the diminishing asset context is subject to the procedural due process requirements for reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.  The County of Yuba ("County") in this case made a determination that Western Aggregates LLC ("Western") had a vested right to mine aggregate from an area within the Yuba Goldfields.  The County had invited Western and other surface mining operators to apply for a vested rights determination following a decision by a superior court in a prior lawsuit that a zoning authorization was not an adequate substitute for a SMARA permit.  In determining that a public adjudicatory hearing, with reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, was required, the Court of Appeal specifically limited its holding to a vested rights claim to conduct a surface mining operation subject to the diminishing asset doctrine.  Therefore, it is not clear whether this decision has any broader application or implication beyond the facts of this case.

Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation District (Dec.6, 2006, F049966) __ Cal.App.4th __ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/

By Maria Pracher

In this case, the appellate court reversed an award of costs in favor of the Modesto Irrigation District (the District) granted by the trial court after the plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandate was denied.  The court found the District had failed to provide sufficient justification for the "unusually high" cost per page for preparing the record and to adequately document the time legitimately charged for assembling the record of the proceedings.

Wolfe v. City of Fremont (Oct. 31, 2006, A112386) __ Cal.App.4^th __ http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/

By Julie Austin

This Court of Appeals’ decision under the Brown Act, which prohibits a majority of members of a local legislative body from reaching a “collective concurrence” outside a noticed public meeting, suggests that an improper consensus may be reached inadvertently during the course of individual conversations between members of a local legislative body.  The court found that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that an improper “collective concurrence” had occurred through a series of one-on-one conversations among the legislative members.  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that all city council members expressed support for a policy before a formal public meeting and that at least one council member had been aware of the other members’ views.  The court noted that the city council’s lack of intent to create a consensus was not fatal to the plaintiff’s case because the Brown Act prohibits even unintentional “collective concurrences.”  This case suggests that in the future, while engaging in otherwise permissible one-on-one discussions with other members of a legislative body, local legislators must be careful not to reveal the views of any other members to avoid inadvertently creating an improper “collective concurrence.”

Western Placer Citizens for an Agricultural and Rural Environment v. County of Placer (3^rd Dist. Nov. 9, 2006)

By Maria Pracher and Julie Austin

In this new California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) case, the Court of Appeal upheld the County's EIR for a sand, gravel, and granite mining and processing project.  The court ruled on two important issues.  First, the County did not violate CEQA by failing to include and analyze a slightly revised project description submitted by the applicant after the final environmental impact report (EIR) had been prepared.  Coupled with this holding, the court found that the County's decision not to prepare additional environmental review of the revised project was supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Second, the court determined that the EIR's water supply analysis was adequate.  The court also found that the plaintiff had exhausted its administrative remedies.

Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (3^rd Dist. Nov. 9, 2006)

By Julie Austin

Two non-profit groups, Citizens for Open Government (Citizens) and Lodi First, opposed the City of Lodi’s certification of a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) and approval of a use permit for a Wal-Mart-anchored shopping center.  The trial court found that Citizens had not exhausted all of its administrative remedies because, even though Lodi First filed an appeal to the City Council, Citizens had not filed its own appeal.  The Court of Appeals reversed this determination and found that Citizens had exhausted its administrative remedies under CEQA and the Municipal Code because Citizens appeared before the City Council to file its own objections and participated in the administrative process.  The court also found that Citizens’ claims were not moot even though a trial court had partially granted Lodi First’s petition and vacated the City Council’s approval of the project.

By John Scheuring

Late in September, the Court of Appeal effectively reversed a judgment against the City of San Diego which, with interest and attorney's fees, was on track to exceed $150 million.  Originally filed in 1995, Border Business Park sued the City on theories of inverse condemnation and breach of contract.  The trial court ruled that the City was liable for (i) publicly announcing that it was considering a proposal for to create an international airport in Otay Mesa (which interfered with sales of property within Border Business Park), and (ii) the City's diversion of truck traffic to a new border crossing with Mexico (which allegedly interfered with access to Border Business Park). The trial court also held the City liable for breach of a development agreement with the Border Business Park (but did grant a motion for new trial on res judicata issues stemming from a previous lawsuit).

By John Scheuring

An en banc panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has vacated an earlier decision by a three-judge panel that, pursuant to the minority language provisions of the federal Voting Rights Act ("VRA") (42 USC §1973aa-1a), California recall petitions must be translated into minority languages.  The Ninth Circuit now joins two other circuits that have found voter-circulated petitions need not be translated into other languages to comply with Section 203 of the VRA. The majority held that these petitions were not materials "provided by" the state and, therefore, petition proponents are not required to comply with the minority language provisions of the VRA.  An interesting aspect of the decision is the courts belief that a translation requirement would have a chilling effect on the petition process itself.  The Court reasoned that if a translation were to be required for a petition in Orange County, the petition would have to be printed in English, Spanish, Vietnamese, Korean and Chinese, the costs of which would fall directly on the proponents of the petition, which may deter participation in the electoral process.  This decision will also end speculation that the VRA might also apply to initiative and referendum petitions.

Preciado v. Wilde, California Court of Appeal, Second District, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 792, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3817, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5563

By Brenna Moorhead

Tenants in common have equal possessory rights in land, therefore more is required to establish title by adverse possession against a cotenant that by adverse possession against a stranger. In Preciado v. Wilde, Plaintiff Preciado and his wife filed an action to quiet title based on adverse possession against Wilde, Preciado's niece. Preciado and Wilde became tenants in common when Wilde inherited interests in two parcels of real property from her father after his death in 1984. 

Establishing title by adverse possession against a stranger requires:

1. actual possession providing reasonable notice to the owner;
2. possession hostile to the owner's title;
3. a claim to the property under color of title or claim of right;
4. five years of continuous, uninterrupted possession; and
5. payment of taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period. 

Adverse possession against a cotenant requires more with respect to notice of the intent to oust the co-tenant of its interest in the common property. One tenant cannot by mere exclusive possession acquire title of the property.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al. v. City of Turlock

By Michael Wilmar and Michael Leake

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., et al. v. City of Turlock, (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District upheld a City of Turlock zoning ordinance which amended the City's general plan to bar the development of “big box” retail stores containing full service grocery departments. Under the ordinance, the City banned the development of “discount superstores,” which it defined as discount stores that exceed 100,000 square fee of gross floor area and devote at least 5 percent of the total sales floor area to the sale of nontaxable merchandise, often in the form of a full-service grocery department. In Wal-Mart's appeal of its earlier Superior Court defeat, it argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional use of the City's police power and that the ordinance failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

By Donna Jones

The California Court of Appeal in Trancas Property Owners Association v. City of Malibu, 2006 WL 802483 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)), upon a rehearing requested by the California League of Cities as Amicus Curiae, recently re-affirmed its decision (discussed in this blog on October 13, 2005) that the City's adoption of a settlement agreement in a closed session violated the Ralph M. Brown Act, Gov't Code section 54950 et seq. (Brown Act).

By Michael Cato

If you own property near a military installation, you may want to obtain a copy of the Advisory Planning Handbook soon to be issued by the Governor's Office of Planning and Research (OPR). Or, you can participate in one of the workshops on the issue being scheduled by OPR. The purpose of the Advisory Planning Handbook is to "promote land use compatibility near military installations." While technically the Handbook is intended to serve only as a "guideline," project opponents often interpret such "guidelines" as regulations that govern a property's allowable uses. As a result, developers or other owners of property near any military installation should review and comment on the draft to assure that the guidelines that appear in the final Advisory Planning Handbook are not overly restrictive.

By Donna Jones

The California Court of Appeal recently re-affirmed the limits on a city's ability to contract away its police power and placed limits on actions that a government can take in closed session. The Court also re-affirmed development agreements as an appropriate method for a city and an owner-developer to exempt a described development from future changes in zoning and density requirements.

By Michael Wilmar

Former Section 6307 permitted the State Lands Commission to make exchanges of tide and submerged terminating the public trust for commerce, navigation, and fishery in the best interests of the state for the following purposes:

• Improvement of navigation
• Aid in reclamation
• Flood control protection
• To enhance the configuration of the shoreline for the improvement of the water and upland on navigable rivers, sloughs, streams, lakes, bays, estuaries, inlets, or straits

On Wednesday, August 24, 2005, the California Supreme Court granted the petitions for review filed by the City of Long Beach and Developers Diversified Realty Corporation, the developer of the Queensway Bay Development Project in Long Beach. This action invalidates the opinion of the Court of Appeal in California Earth Corps v. California State Lands Commission (3rd Dist. 2005) 128 Cal.App. 4th 756. The court of appeal had ruled that the California State Lands Commission had only limited authority under Section 6307 of the Public Resources Code to exchange tidelands held in public trust for lands not held in public trust.

For more information please contact a member of the Real Estate and Construction Law Blog Editorial Team.

By Doug Van Gessel

On August 4 the California Supreme Court ruled, in Grafton Partners v. Superior Court (Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP), 2005 DJDAR 9387 that California contractual provisions in which the parties thereto pre-agree to waive the right to a trial by jury are unenforceable. The unanimous opinion stated that a right to a jury trial is a fundamental constitutional entitlement that cannot be waived in advance of a dispute between the contracting parties unless such a waiver is permitted by statute. Thus, the court has left the door open for the legislature to pass a statute allowing such waivers, and the forum for interests pursuing this debate will likely shift to the legislature now.

By Donna Jones

The San Diego Board of Supervisors approved a Transportation Impact Fee (TIF) that threatens to cripple commercial and industrial development in the unincorporated areas.

By Rafael F. Muilenberg and Donna Jones

"Conversion" of industrial properties to residential use, and "collocation" of residential units near industrial or commercial uses, has attracted concern from some industrial users and environmentalists.

Yet given the housing crisis and the scarcity of residential land available, urban infill and other "smart growth" developments are vital -- and, by their nature, are often located near other uses, including industrial.

Horwitz v. City of Los Angeles (Beglari)
124 Cal. App. 4th 1344 (2d Dist. Dec. 15, 2004) (review filed Jan. 24, 2005)

Trial court properly issued writ commanding the City to revoke all building permits and the certificate of occupancy related to a particular residence where permits were issued in violation of mandatory requirements of zoning ordinance. Los Angeles Planning Commission's ruling in favor of resident - which allowed renovation to the residence to encroach approximately 14 feet into the area of the required front-yard setback - was clearly erroneous because City has no discretion to issue a permit in the absence of compliance with the mandatory set-back requirements.

For more information please contact a member of the Real Estate and Construction Law Blog Editorial Team.

Housing shortages throughout California and the economic and social needs of local communities have sparked a growing interest in infill housing, which is higher density housing, often created in the midst of existing neighborhoods. Infill housing can involve the creation or modification of condominiums, apartments, townhouses, and single-family homes. Infill housing represents not only a response to a housing shortage but also an attempt to address other problems facing California communities. Successful infill housing can only be achieved, however, by understanding the problems, needs, and limitations of each individual community.

Click here to view entire article

For more information please contact a member of the Real Estate and Construction Law Blog Editorial Team.

CEQA:The Environmental Quality Act

(June 29, 2004) 04 C.D.O.S. 5877

By Lori Wider

Introduction

The decision of the Fourth Appellate District in this case reflects a common sense approach to implementing CEQA and its requirements. In upholding an EIR prepared by the City of Irvine for development of the Northern Sphere project on a 7,743-acre site located northeast of the former Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, the California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court and rejected all of Petitioner's claims that the EIR was inadequate and should be set aside. Petitioner Defend the Bay raised a number of issues under the following three primary grounds.